



3 March 2022



RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT:

IMPLICATIONS FOR EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AND SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

OPENING REMARKS:

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German Army, (German/partner perspective)

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MODERATOR:

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Director, Cultural and Area Studies Office (CASO), CGSC

DATE:

Thur. 3 MARCH 2022

TIME:

1300 - 1500 (CST)

LOCATION:

Arnold Conf. Room,
Lewis and Clark Center,
Fort Leavenworth, KS

Background:

- Early 90s - Breakup of the Soviet Union
- U.S. and Russia worked with Ukraine to denuclearize it in exchange for security assurances
- 03 Apr. 2008 - NATO “Bucharest Summit Declaration” consider Ukraine’s and Georgia’s accession ⁽¹⁾
- 2014 - Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula
- 2014- Self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk Republics of Donbass

Russia’s Position:

- NATO stop its eastward expansion and deny membership to Ukraine
- NATO roll back troop deployment to pre-1997 status

U.S./NATO Position:

- NATO’s open-door policy: Sovereign countries can choose their own security alliances
- Giving in to Russia’s demands would hand the Kremlin veto power over NATO’s decision-making
- It would have implications for the continent’s security ⁽²⁾

China’s Position:

- China's foreign minister Wang Yi called Russia's security concerns "legitimate", should be "taken seriously and addressed" ⁽³⁾
- China's official line has been cautious, stopping short of actual support for Russia using military force ⁽⁴⁾

1. NATO Press Release 049 “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” “...NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO”, 03 Apr. 2008. Accessed 14 February, 2022. at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

2. Jen Kirby and Jonathan Guyer, “The Russia-Ukraine crisis, explained,” Vox Media, 12 February, 2022. Accessed 14 February, 2022 at: <https://www.vox.com/22917719/russia-ukraine-invasion-border-crisis-nato-explained>

3. Aljazeera News, “China warns US over Russia’s ‘legitimate security concerns’”, “27 January, 2022. Accessed 14 February, 2022 at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/27/china-warns-us-over-ukraine-interference-in-winter-olympics>

4. Tessa Wong “China: What does it want from the Ukraine crisis with Russia? BBC News, 3 February, 2022. Accessed 14 February, 2022 at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-60242549>



Possible Outcomes of Russia-Ukraine Crisis (Pre-Invasion):

Russia is persuaded that the human casualties, the economic sanctions and the diplomatic fallout would be too great:

- Fear the West might support an insurgency in Ukraine, costly war for Russia
- Putin is potentially convinced that these implications would reduce his domestic support and even threaten his power
- Russia would unlikely accept this scenario since it would not prevent NATO's expansion (1)

Ukraine and Russia could revive the Minsk agreements:

- 2014 and 2015 -The Minsk protocol or the Normandy format set up by French, German, Russian and Ukrainian diplomats to end the war between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed rebels in Donbass
- Since the fighting continued, it obviously failed

Ukraine is to become neutral:

- No NATO membership
- Could be satisfactory for Russia but likely unacceptable for Ukraine and West

Status quo

- Russia continues its relatively low cost support of pro-Russia rebels in Donbass
- Continues its destabilizing impact on Ukraine's politics and most importantly economy
- Putin's calculation: countries with civil unrest would unlikely be provided membership in NATO or EU (2)



1. James Landale, "Ukraine tensions: Can diplomacy prevent war?" BBC 11 March, 2022. Accessed 11 March, 2022 at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60341966>

2. Ben Connable, "Troop-to-Task: A Russian Invasion of Ukraine," Real Clear Defense, 03 February, 2022. Accessed 11 March, 2022 at: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/02/03/troop-to-task-a-russian-invasion-of-ukraine_815091.html

How far have Russian troops advanced?



Source: Institute for the Study of War (as of 23:00 GMT, 2 March)

UKRAINE-RUSSIA CRISIS

Military head-to-head

Russia has **one of the most powerful militaries** in the world. It ranks in the top five nations which spend the most on their military. Since tensions began, **NATO allies have sent additional troops and military equipment** to Ukraine.



Ukraine

209,000*

900,000*

2,040

12,303

2,596

34

98

\$5.9bn | 8.8 percent



Active personnel



Reserve personnel



Artillery



Armoured vehicles



Tanks



Attack helicopters



Fighter/attack aircraft



Military spending, % of
govt spending



Russia

900,000*

2,000,000*

7,571

30,122

12,420

544

1,511

\$61.7bn | 11.4 percent



Source: SIPRI (2020), Global Firepower (2022), IISS (2021)*

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ALJAZEERA



Russia-Ukraine Conflict: (German Partner Perspective)



**LTC Frank
German Army**

**Presentation for the
Cultural and Area Studies Office
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College**

*3 March 2022
unclassified*



Unclassified

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Implications for Euro-Atlantic Security and Sino-American Relationship

- A Partner Perspective -

Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

Winston Churchill






Unclassified



~900 AD



- Trade
- Family



• Coalitions

• Wars

• Tensions

• Conflict

2022 AD







Unclassified



- Never again. Never alone!

- Alliances & Cohesion

- Dual Track approach





Russia-Ukraine Conflict: (The Euro-Atlantic Security Environment)



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Presentation for the
Cultural and Area Studies Office
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Why the Security Environment?

- The crisis in Russia's relations with Ukraine and the West is inextricably linked to the Euro-Atlantic security environment.
- One of Russian President Putin's main goals is to return to the security environment that existed before he assumed the presidency of Russia.
- What is the Euro-Atlantic security system?
- How might it change as a post-post-Cold War security architecture emerges?

Components of the Post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic Security System (1)



- OSCE: Pan-European/Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian scope; norms and standards; arms control
- The West
 - NATO: Collective defense; Putin's bête noir; Transatlantic linkage
 - EU: Economic and political heft; strategic autonomy; leadership – France or Germany?; Brexit
- Russia and Friends
 - CSTO: Intervention in Kazakhstan
 - Union State: Russia and Belarus

Components of the Post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic Security System (2)



- The Neutrals – Finland and Sweden: Strong defense; cooperation with NATO; geography matters
- The United States and the Transatlantic linkage: U.S. leadership matters; Russia aims to decouple the U.S. from Europe



Russia-Ukraine Conflict: ***(Implications for Sino-American relationship)***

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The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Any Implications for the Sino-American Relationship?






Russia and Ukraine ... impact on Sino-American relationship?

- Similarities:

- Xi and Putin both see the US as the primary obstacle to attainment of a new world order where America is not calling most of the shots.
- Both see the US as distracted and Biden as weak, or in a weakened position.
- Both essentially want a “sphere of influence” where they can dominate their neighbors.
- Both seek a return to greatness; one by cobbling together remnants of the USSR; the other, by achieving immense economic power to thereby dictate terms to the rest of the world, i.e. a global order “*with Chinese characteristics*” or, at least, conducive to Chinese interests.

- Differences:

- Russia is an immediate challenge; China is a long-term challenge.
- China’s future has significant potential; Russia’s future is a lot less bright.
- Russia is attempting to control a country hostile to its efforts; Taiwan sees itself as Chinese, but it doesn’t want the Communist system.
- Russia is a commodity-driven economy; China is a production-driven economy.





Russia and Ukraine ... impact on Sino-American relationship?

- The two relationships are quite different, so comparing them is problematic.
- The US has actually done a fairly decent job confronting Russia in this latest incident. Arguably, it has more tools and leverage to work with in the European situation.
- China is committed to reclaiming Taiwan, one way or another, so deterrence is likely a delaying option, but not the end story. Putin longs for the West to respect Russia's security interests; he craves personal respect, too; not interested in resuscitating Communism.
- Taiwan hasn't gotten serious yet about its security, despite rhetoric to the contrary. The population appears less concerned than the government.
- Placing US troops on Taiwan would create a conundrum for China, but the US would be foolish to do so until Taiwan clearly, and unmistakably, demonstrates it's committed to its own long-term security. Taiwan must endure significant pain BEFORE the US commits any forces to the island; without **the stomach for sustained sacrifice**, any US involvement is **a fool's errand**.
 - Currently, Taiwan has the money and manpower for an asymmetric strategy, but lacks the will.
 - If Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us anything, backing an actor without the will to fight or unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices required for success is a bad investment for the US.
 - Looking at the Taiwan problem, realism (i.e. pragmatism) should be the dominant influence on our decisions. What's the return on investment (ROI)? But it can't just be about realism, or we lose a significant edge (soft power).





Russia's Ukraine Crisis – (False) (Legitimacy through 'Coercive' Diplomacy)



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Russia's attempt at "diplomacy"



- Use of selective adherence to treaties/agreements
- Attempt to sway OSCE/UN Security Council
- Bilateral vs. multilateral discussions and correspondence
- Increase in high-level engagements with Western countries
- Expanding regional organizations
 - Offering "observer" status in lieu of full membership



Gadebate: <https://gadebate.un.org/en/70/russian-federation>

NATO vs. CSTO – Primus inter pares?



- Russian desire for CSTO recognition
- Military exercises
 - Expansion of annual exercise
 - Russia “snap” exercises
 - We’ve been here before...a few times
 - NATO deterrence and assurance
 - BTF, Defender Europe, multilateral defense & security cooperation
- CSTO deployments/operations
 - Why Kazakhstan but not Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, etc.?
 - Impact of ongoing Russia activities in Ukraine
- Potential for future Russia-NATO engagement



RT: <https://russian.rt.com/world/video/919628-ucheniya-odkb-boevoe-bratstvo-2021>



Points To Consider



What is at stake?

- Response from West/NATO would mean a loss or gain of credibility
- No credible response would be a major win for Russia
- Russia's win would likely bolster its appetite to expand its influence
- It would affect the global and European security architecture
- Role of Russia, China and their partners
- Potential for increased nuclear proliferation

Key questions:

- Can the West and Russia find a mutually acceptable compromise to save face or
- Will we witness another major global conflict?



Questions/Answers/Comments

Organization and Capabilities



Source documents provide guidance for training in three broad areas.

- 1) **Core Cultural Competencies:** Core cultural competencies include areas such as understanding culture, applying organizational awareness, cultural perspective taking, and cultural adaptability.
- 2) **Regional/Technical Competencies:** Regional/technical competencies deal with applying regional information and operating in a regional environment.
- 3) **Leader/Influence Functions:** Leader/influence functions include strategic (cultural) agility, (cultural) systems thinking, cross-cultural influences, organizational cultural competence, and utilizing interpreters/advisors.

CJCSI 1800.01D (Officer PME Policy) and CJCSI 1805.01A (Enlisted PME Policy).



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YouTube link: <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLkGvnfy3ladNRMPT-sNHpAsz8a3npWBH8>

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